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State Safety Nets and Work Incentives

Saturday, November 7, 10:15 to 11:45am, Property: Boston Marriott Copley Place, Floor: 4th Floor, Room: Salon A

Abstract

Policy debates about redistribution to households with low incomes reflect a classic economic tradeoff. Those with the fewest resources stand to benefit the most from additional support, generating potential social welfare gains. At the same time, anti-poverty policies may distort behavior and create inefficiencies, especially if they weaken labor supply incentives. Because work incentives are determined by the full package of taxes and transfers, they should be assessed at the system level rather than program by program.The safety net has evolved substantially over the past few decades. The pre-1996 AFDC program had high implicit marginal tax rates, whereas the TANF replacement emphasized work requirements. Refundable tax credits have become a major source of benefits, and these are typically unavailable to families without earnings. This paper uses a simulated eligibility approach to quantify the incentives embedded in programs for families without work-limiting disabilities: the federal and state EITCs and CTCs, the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program (TANF), and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). Specifically, we investigate how incentives to enter the labor force at the extensive margin vary across states and over time, using variation in tax and transfer benefit rules by state, year, marital status, and number and age of children.The proposed project builds on the simulated eligibility calculator built by the authors and used in previous work (Schmidt, Shore-Sheppard, and Watson 2016, 2023, and 2025). We focus on pre-Covid policy years 2005-2019 and use a common simulated sample of unmarried and married families with children, drawn from the March Annual Social and Economic Supplement to the Current Population Survey. For each family, we calculate imputed benefits and tax liabilities as if the family lived in each state and year and fully participated in all available programs, using simulated earnings in $1,000 increments. We use the NBER TAXSIM model to estimate federal and state income tax liabilities, including the refundable EITC and CTC. We then code TANF eligibility and benefit rules for the 50 states and the District of Columbia using the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database. Using simulated earnings and imputed TANF benefits to determine income, we estimate SNAP eligibility and benefits. This procedure allows us to trace the resources available to families as parents increase work hours. We also exploit variation in program rules across states and over time, including federal SNAP variation induced by differences in state TANF generosity. For families without earnings, the safety net became less generous in nearly every state between 2001 and 2019, largely because of TANF’s decline. At the same time, expansions in federal and state tax credits, along with SNAP, increased support for low-income working families. As a result, returns to work differ substantially across states. For example, a simulated single parent taking a job paying $15,000 annually can expect an increase in total resources of less than $13,000 in some states and more than $17,000 in others. State policy environments therefore play an important role in shaping the work incentives facing low-income families.

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