Individual Submission Summary
Share...

Direct link:

The Role of Citizen Information in Shaping Program Errors in State Unemployment Insurance Field Offices

Friday, November 6, 3:30 to 5:00pm, Property: Boston Marriott Copley Place, Floor: 4th Floor, Room: Salon K

Abstract

This study develops a theory rooted in risk aversion and anchoring bias in organizational decision making, predicting that the quality of claimant-provided information in terms of completeness and biasedness affects the accuracy of frontline eligibility determinations, with these effects intensifying under higher local service demand. Based on 317,633 individual eligibility determinations made by 1,173 field offices of 42 state unemployment insurance program (UIPs) between 2002 and 2023, the analysis finds that frontline decisions are shaped by the provision of both incomplete and inaccurate information by claimants seeking program benefits. Incomplete information is associated with a 47.64% increase in overpayment errors and a 1.92% increase in underpayment errors, which translates to approximately $3.9 million in overpaid and $0.16 million in underpaid benefits each week. The direction of biased wage reporting produces anchoring effects, a 6.22% increase in overpayment errors for positively biased wage information and a 3.51% increase in underpayment errors for negatively biased wage information reported by claimant. Notably, errors driven by incomplete information are selectively responsive to local service demand, whereas those stemming from inaccurate information are not. These findings reflect the limited discretion field office agents have in handling inaccurate information, since monetary eligibility determinations based on wage reporting are highly standardized.

The theory and evidence of this study contribute to the understanding of government program performance and citizen-state interactions in several ways. First, it identifies an underexplored source of unequal access to government services, the geography of citizen-state interactions. While the existing research emphasizes individual-level differences in the ability to navigate administrative requirements (Halling and Baekgaard 2024), this study argues that inequality also arises from differences in local administrative environments, particularly variation in service demand across field offices. More broadly, the study connects how administrative requirements in welfare programs map onto the distribution of government services through biased decision making, and how that varies across geography of local service demand.

Author