Bureaucrats’ Responses to Burdens: Do Compliance, Learning, and Psychological Costs Trigger Distinct Role Orientations?

• In Event: Administrative Burdens and Effectiveness of the Social Safety Net

Abstract

Administrative burdens refer to one or a combination of compliance, learning, and psychological costs (Heinrich, 2016; Herd & Moynihan, 2018; Masood et al., 2021; Moynihan et al., 2015). Yet, the extant literature treats burdens as a homogenous concept. This study disaggregates the types of burdens and examines how they affect the role orientation bureaucrats adopt.

Two main narratives describe how frontline workers exercise discretion—the state agent narrative and the citizen agent narrative (Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Within the first narrative, bureaucrats are rule-oriented enforcers of public policies; within the second, they are citizen-oriented. While neutrality has long been a core value in the bureaucratic ethos, multiple studies document that bureaucrats act as moral agents who advance the interests of those they serve (e.g., Kelly, 1994; Riccucci, 2005; Zacka, 2017). Building on these classical narratives, we propose that bureaucrats adopt four identities while dealing with clients: 1) rule-enforcer identity; 2) client-helper identity; 3) system-protector identity, and 4) equal-treatment identity. 

We conduct a randomized survey experiment on a sample of 600 U.S. public administrators recruited via Prolific. The prompts draw on an actual state-level rental assistance program across two recipient groups, considered vulnerable: the elderly and Black people. Because burdens come in different forms and vary in the costs they impose on users of public programs, we manipulate the type of burden (learning, compliance, psychological) and study here the impact of each on bureaucrats’ orientation. 

The study contributes to the literature by providing a disaggregated assessment of burdens (learning, compliance, and psychological costs) and their effects on bureaucrats’ behavior. Second, by assessing the effect of burdens in the context of race, we contribute to research on racialized burdens (e.g., Ray et al., 2023). Third, the study enhances our understanding of the nuanced effects of administrative burdens across different vulnerable groups and clarifies the mechanisms that drive bureaucrats’ responses to these burdens.

References: 

Heinrich, C. J. (2016). The bite of administrative burden: A theoretical and empirical investigation. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 26(3), 403-420.
Herd, P. & Moynihan, D. P. (2018). Administrative burden: Policymaking by other means. Manhattan, New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Kelly, M. (1994). Theories of justice and street-level discretion. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 4(2), 119–140.
Masood, A., & Azfar Nisar, M. (2021). Administrative capital and citizens’ responses to administrative burden. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 31(1), 56–72.
Maynard-Moody, S., & Musheno, M. (2000). State agent or citizen agent: Two narratives of discretion. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 10(2), 329–358.
Ray, V., Herd, P., & Moynihan, D. (2023). Racialized burdens: Applying racialized organization theory to the administrative state. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 33(1), 139-152.
Riccucci, N. M. (2005). Street-level bureaucrats and intrastate variation in the implementation of temporary assistance for needy families policies. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 15(1), 89–111.
Zacka, B. (2017). When the state meets the street: Public service and moral agency. Harvard University Press.

Author

• Donavon Johnson, Florida International University
  Presenting Author