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[Background]
Public organisations pursue multiple goals and must allocate limited organisational attention across competing tasks. External public pressure may redirect administrative attention, but organisational responses are likely to depend on existing priorities (Gilad, 2015). Unlike pressures from politicians, consumers, or the media, ombudsman complaints are processed through an institutionally independent and rule-bound channel for expressing dissatisfaction with public services. However, this form of external pressure has rarely been examined in relation to subsequent service outcomes. This study exploits a distinction between ‘A’ roads, which generally receive greater administrative priority, and lower-priority ‘B’ and ‘C’ roads to examine whether the relationship between complaints and subsequent outcomes varies with existing organisational priorities.
[Purpose]
This study examines whether ombudsman complaint rates are systematically associated with subsequent changes in local service conditions. It also considers whether this relationship differs across tasks receiving different levels of administrative priority.
[Research Question]
Are ombudsman complaint rates associated with next-year road-condition outcomes, conditional on current road conditions, and is this relationship stronger for higher-priority ‘A’ roads than for lower-priority ‘B’ and ‘C’ roads?
[Data and Methods]
The study combines administrative complaint records with official measures of road conditions for English local highway authorities over multiple financial years. Fixed-effects models examine whether complaint rates in one year are associated with road conditions in the following year, conditional on current road conditions. The models account for time-invariant differences between local authorities and common changes across financial years. Additional analyses directly compare the estimated relationships across road classes.
[Results]
Higher complaint rates are associated with subsequent improvements in the condition of ‘A’ roads. By contrast, no comparable association is detected for ‘B’ and ‘C’ roads. A direct comparison confirms that the relationship is stronger for ‘A’ roads than for ‘B/C’ roads.
Additional analyses show that complaint rates are positively associated with current road problems across both road categories. Complaints therefore appear to contain information about objectively measured service conditions, even where they are not associated with subsequent improvements. The overall pattern suggests that responsiveness to complaint pressure is selective rather than uniform across tasks.
[Conclusion and Contribution]
The findings are consistent with theories of organisational attention and suggest that institutionalised complaint pressure may be associated with subsequent service outcomes when it aligns with existing administrative priorities. The study extends the literature by showing that the relationship between external pressure and service outcomes may vary across tasks within the same policy area. It highlights ombudsman-mediated complaints as an important form of external pressure connecting public dissatisfaction with subsequent service outcomes.
[References]
Gilad, S. (2009) ‘Juggling conflicting demands: The case of the UK Financial Ombudsman Service’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 19(3), pp. 661–680.
Gilad, S. (2015) ‘Political pressures, organizational identity, and attention to tasks: Illustrations from pre-crisis financial regulation’, Public Administration, 93(3), pp. 593–608.