Presidential Unilateral Actions as a Tool of Voter Mobilization

• In Event: Models of the Presidency

Abstract

The advent of the unilateral presidency is one of the features of modern American politics. The puzzle is that presidents do not always rely on unilateral actions to establish a preferred policy. Recent studies suggest political constraints originating from public opinion as a key to solving this puzzle. However, the mechanism through which public opinion constrains the president's unilateral action has not been identied. In this paper, we propose a theory and formal model to identify the mechanism. In our model, presidential unilateral action is costly a tool of voter mobilization. Presidents unilaterally act only if they can mobilize enough voters to expect electoral victory. Moreover, the political landscape surrounding presidents determines whether unilateral actions can be an eective mobilizing tool. As a result, our model shows the conditional nature of political constraints that determines the nature of the presidency:
from the "imperial presidency" to the "lame duck presidency."

Author

• Myunghoon Kang, Washington University in St. Louis