Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Personal Schedule
Sign In
Do political parties target economic benefits to safe or swing districts? To date, this question has been examined primarily in countries with plurality electoral rules – most notably the United States. It remains unclear, however, what role competitiveness may play in proportional rule (PR) countries. In this paper, I examine the effects of electoral competitiveness on economic policy in PR countries using geo-coded quantitative data combined with qualitative evidence from interviews of government ministers and bureaucrats. Two key results emerge. First, geographically-diffuse industries receive more generous subsidies than geographically-concentrated industries. This result stands in stark contrast to findings from plurality rule countries where more concentrated groups tend to win greater rents. Geography appears to have different policy effects in different institutional settings. Second, “safe” districts (i.e. those where the largest government party won by a considerable margin) win more generous subsidies than competitive districts. Competitiveness influences economic policy in both PR and plurality systems albeit in different ways.