Stewards of Accountability: A Field Experiment on Corruption & Inefficiency in Local Public Works

• In Event: Distortions to Democracy: Corruption, Clientelism, and Voter Intimidation

Abstract

In developing contexts, the regulatory framework is generally weak and accountability is often lacking. Corruption expands to cover a number of government activities, including the construction of public infrastructure. In this sector, corruption is associated with time and cost overruns, and so the question is whether civil society oversight that is explicitly supported by the relevant authorities can improve the execution of public infrastructure projects. The study builds on a sample of 200 urban and peri-urban district governments spread across Peru that are supposed to channel central government funds toward the efficient construction of roads, sidewalks, and similar public works. Half of the districts were randomly selected to enter into a control group. The other half received letters noting that specific projects under their charge were actively being monitored by members of civil society and that the authorities supported the monitoring activities. The results show that the districts that received the monitoring intervention are completing the infrastructure projects under their charge in a more expedient and cost-effective manner. The results, thus, support greater collaboration between civil society organizations and authorities for the purpose of improving local government accountability.

Author

• Paul Lagunes, Columbia University