Administrative Capacity and the Diverse Effect of Authoritarian Elections

• In Event: Democratization by Elections?

Abstract

Why do elections sometimes stabilize authoritarian rule while at other times, they lead to their demise? I argue that the effect of multi-party elections in dictatorships depends on the degree to which rulers control an efficient administrative apparatus which can be abused to subtly manipulate elections. In high capacity regimes, elites are deterred from defecting, the opposition is split and co-opted, and citizens refrain from protesting, leaving the autocrat in control of elections. In cross-national analyses of all authoritarian regimes from 1960-2006, I find that for low and medium levels of administrative capacity elections are associated with breakdown. As capacity increases, however, electoral authoritarian regimes are more stable than their non-electoral counterparts. The results may explain existing divisions within the literature on electoral authoritarianism and point to the importance of recognizing not only institutional differences across autocracies but also variation in the environment in which such institutions are embedded.

Author

• Merete Bech Seeberg, Department of Political Science, Aarhus University