Concurrent Elections, Turnout, and Interest Group Influence

• In Event: Election Timing: Causes and Consequences

Abstract

While the literature has often argued that high turnout is not beneficial from a welfare point of view, a potential problem with low turnout elections is that they can be captured by interest groups. Non-concurrent local elections in Germany are particularly vulnerable, because they typically exhibit low turnout and the size of the local public administration as an important interest group can be large. Using a quasi-random timing of local elections, I provide evidence that spending on the local public administration significantly increases after non-concurrent elections. This effect is larger when the targeted interest group, i.e. the local public administration, is larger. Finally, I find that the public administration is not per se more likely to participate in low turnout elections, but that it is more likely to attend those low turnout elections that happen to be close.

Author

• Sebastian Garmann, Ruhr-University Bochum