The Impact of Single-Member and At-Large Voting Districts on Local Democracy

• In Event: Modifications to State & Local Electoral Rules

Abstract

In many local elections throughout the United States, multiple candidates can compete for and win the same public office ("at-large districts"). This is in contrast to the classic majoritarian electoral scheme in which one candidate is chosen to represent a single geographical subunit ("single-member districts"). Although at-large voting systems have historically been used to suppress minority representation, as a bare majority of a district can dictate the composition of the entire governing body, scholars remain divided over the contemporary implications for the interests of underrepresented groups. A recent wave of litigation against school districts with at-large elections under California's 2001 Voting Rights Act (CVRA) provides a unique opportunity to identify the causal effects of at-large versus single-member districts on local representation and accountability. We exploit random variation in the plaintiff selection process to construct a plausible counterfactual for school districts that were legally mandated to convert. We also use geographical proximity to areas with ongoing CVRA litigation as an instrument for conversion, as the threat of expensive legal action has led many districts to voluntarily make the switch. Finally, we match Californian districts undergoing CVRA litigation to comparable units in other states being sued under the federal Voting Rights Act, exploiting differences in the timing of the two legal processes. Taking advantage of a rich new dataset on school district elections, local voter participation, and school finance and educational achievement outcomes allows us to assess the consequences of at-large and single-member voting rules for both descriptive and substantive representation, and to explore the link between the two.

Authors

• Carolyn Abott, The Ohio State University

• Asya Magazinnik, Princeton University