Full Court Press: The Causes and Consequences of Executive Court Curbing

• In Event: Executive Branch Politics in the U.S. Federal Judiciary

Abstract

Within the separation of powers literature, scholars have dedicated substantial effort to analyzing the conditions under which legislators decide to sanction the Supreme Court, and if and when those sanctions are successful. Comparatively less attention has been paid to the executive case. How frequently does the President sanction the Court, and under what circumstances does this activity constrain the Court'€™s behavior? At present, there is no comprehensive database that allows us to directly interrogate these questions. Here, we unveil the first stage of a large-scale data collection effort of executive Court curbing, provide some initial insight to the questions above, and detail ideas for future scholarship that addresses the full complement of inter-institutional constraints on the judiciary.

Authors

• Alyx Mark, North Central College

• Michael Zilis, University of Kentucky