Street Level Autocrats: The Logic of Nonviolent Revolutions

• In Event: The Logic of Non-Violent Resistance

Abstract

Violent uprisings last about two and a half times as long as non-violent campaigns. Brutal repression of a non-violent campaign can end the conflict quickly. Widespread defection among the security forces also leads to a relatively quick end to a non-violent campaign. To better understand how strategic non-violence works, we analyze two sets of strategic interactions. The first involves the mobilization of civil society. The second regards the interactions between civil society and the security forces of the incumbent regime. If the security forces defect, the chances of success for a non-violent campaign increase substantially. Defection can take the form of desertion of shirking (standing by idly) and not following orders to repress. Non-violent tactics are much more likely to lead to defection than violent tactics. Popular mobilization critically depends on overcoming both the collective action problem and the response from the incumbent regime. We develop a game theoretic model that shows the conditions under which the mobilization of civil society is likely to lead to defection or principled shirking among members of the security apparatus. Non-violent strategies affect all aspects of the game, affecting civil society and how well the autocratic coalition holds together. The model explains why civil resistance works. We test the implications of the model statistically, using duration analyses, and find support for the key propositions.

Authors

• Marianne Dahl, PRIO / NTNU

• Scott Gates, PRIO

• Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)