Representation and the Top-Two Primary: A Moderating Effect for Promise Making

• In Event: The Effects of Electoral System Rules

Abstract

The top-two primary system adopted by California and Washington changes the traditional two-stage electoral process by placing all candidates, regardless of party affiliation, into a single blanket primary in the first stage of the election cycle. The two candidates that receive the most votes will proceed to a runoff in the general election, regardless of party affiliation. Those in favor of the top-two primary argue that the reform will encourage primary candidates to appeal to all voters, not just their respective party bases. Further, advocates contend that if safe districts offer voters the choice between ideologically extreme and moderate candidates of the same party in the general election, safe districts may send more moderate candidates to state legislatures. Previous work on the top-two primary finds evidence that voters do not select the more moderate of two legislative candidates from the same party in the general election because they lack the information to make ideological distinctions between them. If the top-two primary does invoke moderation, I argue that previous work has looked for it in the wrong place. Instead, I expect that moderation will be self-imposed by candidates in response to new electoral incentives. Even if most voters are uninformed or inattentive, candidates remain sensitive to district-level pressures that inform them about the position of district median voter and respond by attempting to position themselves accordingly. I argue that the new electoral rules and broader electorates found in the top-two primary should, on average, cause candidates to self-moderate in hopes of capturing the median voter in their respective districts.

Author

• Steven Sparks, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill