Drivers of Pre-Electoral Manipulations in the 2013 Cambodian Election

• In Event: Electoral Malpractice in East and Southeast Asia Mini-Conference

Abstract

Existing studies make different predictions about the methods, timing, severity and location of electoral manipulations. Some see the desire to win while at the same time minimizing legitimacy costs associated with overt fraud as the driving force, expecting manipulations to be more prevalent where the ruling party is under threat (Schedler 2013). Others suggest that indirect effects beyond winning – such as demoralizing and containing the opposition – motivate electoral manipulations, and that their extent is primarily driven simply by the capacity to implement them (Simpser 2013). This study assesses both arguments with a case study of voter registration malpractice in the 2013 Cambodian election. A novel dataset of domestic election observer reports and official registration numbers is employed to measure fraudulent voter registries. Local electoral competitiveness facing the ruling party and the capacities of local operatives to orchestrate manipulation are monitored through previous election national and Commune council election results, respectively.

Author

• Max Grömping, The University of Sydney