Voice and Balancing in US Congressional Elections

• In Event: How Voters View Congress

Abstract

Halfway into a presidential term, Congressional elections give voters an opportunity to adjust the course of federal policy as they see fit. The president’s party generally loses votes on these occasions. Two complementary mechanisms suggest how strategic policy-oriented behavior might contribute to the midterm loss: a direct mechanism, where centrist voters strengthen the out-party in Congress to "balance" the president’s impact on policy; and an indirect mechanism, where voters use midterm elections to "voice" their preference for a centrist agenda as a signal to the president. Despite strong theory, however, compelling evidence for strategic midterm behavior is relatively scarce. We tackle the problem on the individual level by identifying voters who have a policy-oriented incentive to turn against the president’s party. Using survey data from all midterm elections since 1974, we find that a significant number of voters behave in line with balancing and voice incentives, controlling for partisanship and presidential approval. Moreover, these effects are particularly strong under circumstances that make balancing and voice more necessary or promising.

Authors

• Robert S. Erikson, Columbia University

• Till Weber, Baruch College, CUNY