Party-candidate Linkages and Anti-Incumbency Voting: Evidence from Indian States

• In Event: New Insights into Party Institutionalization in Developing Countries

Abstract

Scholars studying developing democracies have been puzzled by high levels of anti-incumbency voting. An often overlooked factor in studies of voting behavior is the strength  of party-candidate linkages: the extent to which parties and candidates maintain stable alliances in consecutive elections. In this paper we argue that weak linkages split voters' loyalties between parties and candidates, and diffuse the responsibility for who is to be held accountable for performance in office, leading to higher levels of anti-incumbency and weaker economic voting.  We show evidence for these claims using constituency-level electoral data from Indian state assembly elections between 1986 and 2005 as well as individual-level survey data from the Indian National Election Study from 2004. The results suggest that given stable electoral alternatives, voters in a developing democracy make their vote choice on the basis of the performance of the incumbent in much the same way as in developed democracies.

Authors

• Francesca R. Jensenius, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

• Pavithra Suryanarayan, Johns Hopkins University