Formal Cooperation between States and Violent Non-State Organizations

• In Event: Poster Session Part I: Conflict Processes

Abstract

Why do states and foreign violent non-state organizations (VNSOs) like rebel groups, terrorist organizations, and paramilitaries, formalize their coordination through explicit, written agreements? Once signed, why do we observe varying levels of compliance?  At face value, a state’s decision to support foreign VNSOs is unsurprising. Historically, many states have financially and militarily supported these organizations to more effectively secure foreign policy interests. Providing this assistance, however, neither requires states nor VNSOs to sign formal security agreements. In fact, states’ and VNSOs’ decision to formalize their commitments is puzzling.  These partnerships restrict states’ and VNSOs’ abilities to pursue security policies autonomously, place legal responsibility for VNSO actions on the state, and are not clearly enforceable by either actor. As such, this paper explores the critical yet understudied phenomena of formalized and publicized security agreements between states and foreign VNSOs. I argue that VNSOs’ and states will be more likely to enter into formal partnerships and make more extensive commitments when VNSOs possess ‘state-like’ characteristics, namely a centralized, hierarchical chain of command and the ability to generate audience costs.‘State-like’ VNSOs and states are able to credibly commit to formal agreements because these institutional similarities stabilize these actors’ expectations about their ally’s ability and willingness to fulfill future commitments. Broadly, my findings help us better understand VNSOs’ critical role in international cooperation and the development of conflict. Understanding the conditions under which states and VNSOs formally coordinate can help governments foster cooperation in conflict-prone regions. I assess my theory with a mixed-methods design: I conduct statistical analyses of a unique, large-N data set of characteristics of VNSOs, states, and aspects of the formalization of their commitments to each other. I undergird these analyses with two case studies: first, the recent agreement signed between the U.S. and the Kurdish forces fighting the Islamic State agreement; second, the relationship between the U.S., Jordan, and the Syrian National Coalition and the Southern Front, two competing Syrian rebel coalitions. These case studies draw from extensive ethnographic research I conducted in Iraqi-Kurdistan and Jordan.

Author

• Melissa Anne Carlson, University of California, Berkeley