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Spending for Stability: Resource Dependence and Education

Sat, September 2, 2:00 to 3:30pm, Parc 55, Cyril Magnin III

Abstract

Spending on tertiary education in resource abundant authoritarian countries far exceeds spending in democratic and non-resource dependent countries. What explains this high level of spending on education in an authoritarian context? This paper exploits over time variation in regime type in Venezuela and Ecuador to analyze spending on education in the context of resource dependence. It leverages qualitative and quantitative data collected during fieldwork in both countries.

The literature on the resource curse has argued that authoritarian regimes in resource dependent countries stay in power through the rentier bargain, a kind of social contract where citizens accept an authoritarian system in exchange for no taxation and the provision of some goods and services. The literature on social spending, however, has so far argued that democracies outspend autocracies in education. Under what conditions do authoritarian leaders spend on education? This paper examines the case of the provision of education under resource dependence. It argues that spending on education under resource dependence is determined by concerns about employment and unemployment.

This project contributes to two bodies of literature that have so far not been extensively connected: the literature on the resource curse and the literature on social spending in developing countries, an important contribution given the large proportion of developing countries that are resource dependent and the number of people that live in these countries.

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