Parties, Legislators, and the Origins of Proportional Representation

• In Event: The Dynamics and Consequences of Internal Party Politics

Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that proportional representation (PR) was introduced in many European democracies by traditional conservative parties seeking to preserve their legislative seat shares after franchise extension and industrialization increased the vote base of leftist parties. In contrast to this seat-centered account, we focus on how adopting PR affected party leaders’ control over nominations, thereby enabling them to discipline their followers, and facilitating the negotiations needed to form coalition governments. After explaining the general logic of our portfolio-centered account, we test it in the specific case of Norway. Using roll call data from six different reform proposals in 1919, we show that frontbenchers were more likely to vote in favor of adopting PR than backbenchers, even controlling for the parties’ expected seat payoffs. Moreover, using within-legislator variation, we show that the internal cohesion of the major parties increased significantly after the adoption of PR.

Authors

• Gary W. Cox, Stanford University

• Jon H. Fiva, Norwegian Business School

• Daniel M. Smith, Harvard University