The Death Penalty as a Strategic Diversion During Bad Economic Times

• In Event: Law, Courts, and the U.S. Criminal Justice System

Abstract

Do economic conditions explain the risk of execution confronting death row inmates in the American States? This question is central to the motivations underlying capital punishment. Regardless of conditions of their incarceration, death row inmates survive under the will of the state. Since inmates cannot exit death row voluntarily they are “at risk” of execution. I theorize that executions reflect economic conditions in the state exercising legal jurisdiction over the inmate’s fate. I further theorize that these economic effects are mediated by gubernatorial politics. In essence, during periods of economic downturn, political forces mobilize more aggressively against death row inmates, viewing them with greater antipathy and increasing their risk and likelihood of execution than during periods of economic boom. I rely on data from the U.S. Bureau of Justice statistics as well as political and economic indicators from the various states. Preliminary analysis strongly suggests that death row inmates face greater hazard of execution during economic downturns, even after accounting for fluctuations in the violent crime rate. This is especially true if the inmate is black. Interestingly, partisanship and electoral safety concerns of governors significantly mediate the process, suggesting that from the perspective of political executives, executions constitute a strategic diversion from a bad economy and this tends to undercut the deterrence justification upon which much of American system of capital punishment rests.

Author

• Isaac Unah, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill