Strategic Voting across Electoral Systems: England and the US, 2014-16

• In Event: The Effects of Electoral System Rules

Abstract

Cox (1997) advances a theory of strategic voting away from sincerely preferred third party candidates incorporating both Duvergerian and non-Duvergerian equilibria, largely depending on voter perceptions of the two- or multi-way competitiveness of the election. This paper explores the existence of both equilibria in the votes for minor party candidates in England by contrasting voting support under different electoral systems. Specifically, the paper examines the drop-odd in support for UKIP, Liberal Democrat, and Green Party candidates between the 2014 election for European Parliament (conducted under proportional representation, thus a measure of sincere support) and the 2015 election for national parliament (conducted under first-past-the-post single member districts). The paper finds that the strategic gap in support for these candidates is heavily a function of both the perceived competitiveness gap between Conservative and Labor, and the perceived gap between the less competitive major party and the most competitive minor party, supporting both sets of theorized equilibria. Finally, the paper explores the application of these theories to support for third party candidates in the 2016 American presidential election, again as a function of perceived competitiveness among all candidates.

Author

• Nicholas Goedert, Virginia Tech