Party Strategies as Deterrents of Electoral Punishment of Corruption

• In Event: Public Opinion and Law Enforcement

Abstract

Due to its adverse effects on economic and democratic developments, political corruption is recognized as a malign and objectionable practice by both voters and party representatives. Yet, while the latter practice it, the former fail to consistently punish it. This project seeks to improve our understanding of this puzzle in transitioning democracies by assessing the link between party strategies and voters’ electoral decisions. Specifically, this project asks, “What explains within- and across- country variation in patterns of electoral punishment towards corruption in transitioning democracies? And, under what conditions are some political parties whose representatives engage in corrupt practices better positioned to curb electoral punishment and even preserve political legitimacy while others face severe public backlash and bleak electoral outcomes?

In contrast to much of the existing literature currently focused on the provision of contingent goods as a party strategy for influencing voters’ decisions and maximizing electoral gains, I introduce a theoretical argument that maintains that a key strategy used by political parties to effect voters' willingness to punish political corruption, is the provision of institutional and policy measures that directly benefit their constituents. I argue that the mechanism driving this strategy is the appointment of party-trusted individuals to key administrative decision-making positions in the public sphere. Strategic appointments allow corrupt politicians and clientelist parties to optimize their information flows, increase their policy making efficiency and strengthen their organizational structure in a way that allows parties to shift past reliance on the distribution of direct goods and patronage as an electoral resource. I further hypothesize that this strategy allows corrupt political actors to increase voters tolerance of their corrupt and clientelist tendencies, while strengthening their organizational core, increasing the density of their networks and ultimately enhancing their legitimacy and anchoring their presence in the political system.

To test my hypotheses in a systematic manner, I construct an original dataset that accounts for cases of political corruption by party representatives in sixteen transitioning democracies of Eastern Europe and the Balkan region during the scope of 2000-2014. This subset of countries includes: Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Latvia, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia. To dissect the various components of my theory, I further present a detailed, case-study assessment of the Albanian case. This account provides valuable insight into the conditions under which electoral punishment towards political corruption is more likely to emerge. I utilize a multivariate analysis of time-series-cross-sectional data that considers the effect of both micro- and macro- influences on voters’ electoral response to corruption and find empirical support for my hypotheses. These findings call attention to the factors that underlie distinct patterns of variation in voters’ tolerance towards corruption and contribute to the literature concerned with party legitimacy, democratic performance and the democratic prospects of the transitioning democracies of the Eastern and Central European region.

Author

• Albana Shehaj, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor