Who Punishes Extremist Nominees?

• In Event: How Voters View Congress

Abstract

Political observers, campaign experts, and academics alike argue bitterly over whether it is more important for a party to capture ideologically moderate swing voters or to encourage turnout among hardcore partisans. In this paper, we speak to this debate by examining the link between the ideology of congressional candidates and the turnout of their parties’ bases in U.S. House races, 2006-2012. Combining a set of observational analyses and a regression discontinuity design in close primary races with survey and administrative data on partisan turnout, we examine how nominating more ideologically extreme candidates affects election results and who turns out to vote in the general election. We find that extremist nominees suffer electorally, largely because they decrease their party’s share of turnout in the general election, skewing the electorate towards their opponent’s party. Along with shedding light on questions concerning the interplay of parties, voters, and candidates, the results help address the debate over swing voters and turning out the base. For our sample of elections, at least, turnout appears to be more important than swing voters are in determining election outcomes, but it advantages ideologically moderate candidates because extremists activate the opposing party’s base more than their own.

Author

• Daniel M Thompson, Stanford University