Distortions to Democracy: Corruption, Clientelism, and Voter Intimidation

Session Submission Type: Full Submitted Panel

Session Description

Democracy is celebrated for encouraging responsiveness to the collective interest. The theory is that as long as elections are freely contested, participation is widespread, and citizens enjoy political liberties politicians will act in the best interest of the public. Research even shows that democracies have higher per capita incomes than autocracies. What, then, explains the dissatisfaction with democracy? One possibility is that the institutional mechanisms that are supposed to promote government responsiveness have been misapplied, weakened, or even corrupted. This is an issue that our panel aims to explore. We seek to understand the extent to which bribery, vote buying, voter intimidation, and extreme contestation have distorted democratic rule in the modern age.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 6: POLITICAL ECONOMY

Individual Presentations

• Village Social Network Structures and Political Violence - Cesi Cruz, University of British Columbia

• When and Why Political Competition is Bad for Public Goods Provision - Jessica Gottlieb, Texas A&M University

• Vote Buying and Campaign Promises - Philip Keefer, Inter-American Development Bank; Razvan Vlaicu, Inter-American Development Bank

• Stewards of Accountability: A Field Experiment on Corruption & Inefficiency in Local Public Works - Paul Lagunes, Columbia University

Chair

• Philip Keefer Inter-American Development Bank

Discussants

• Simeon C. Nichter UC San Diego

• Rebecca Weitz-Shapiro Brown University