Negotiating Agreement in Congress: Parties, Polarization, and Legislative Action

Session Submission Type: Full Submitted Panel

Session Description

Based on the recommendations of the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 2013, the Social Science Research Council (SSRC) created an initiative to support research on the processes of negotiating agreement in Congress. As the SSRC put it: “processes of negotiating agreement in Congress are under great stress, yet we know very little about the mechanics, challenges, and remedies for this problem.”

Each of the authors on this panel, as well as the chair and discussant, are affiliated with the SSRC’s initiative. James Curry and France Lee’s paper argues that calls for a return to “regular order” may not improve Congress’s operation and may, in fact, hinder Congress’s capacity to enact legislation in an environment marked by high partisanship, small majorities, and frequent divided government. Josh Ryan’s paper uses a new dataset of committee votes from the 92nd through the 113th Congress and shows that by requiring committee roll call votes, the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 made it easier for party leaders to monitor the behavior of members thus increasing party polarization and affecting Congress’s capacity to make law. Nate Birkhead and Jordan Ragusa examine efforts in Congress to repeal legislation, arguing that repeals are most likely to occur in eras when the parties are ideologically homogenous and differentiated and the parties are in a period of transition. Lastly, David Doherty and Laurel Harbridge Yong use observational data of legislators’ public communications and a survey experiment to study how lawmakers explain gridlock and the effectiveness of blaming others for legislative inaction, thereby avoiding accountability and punishment.

Individually, the papers on this panel vary in terms of their analytical focus: rates of bill passage, roll-call votes, legislation repealed, and explanations of gridlock. A range of methodological approaches are represented as well: elite interviews, large-n studies, historical case studies, content analysis and experimental designs. Collectively, however, they all speak to the institutional and electoral factors that shape Congress’s capacity to negotiate agreement and the challenges of legislative reform efforts.

Sub Unit

• DIVISION 22: LEGISLATIVE STUDIES

Individual Presentations

• What is Regular Order Worth? Congressional Processes and Congressional Lawmaking - James M. Curry, University of Utah; Frances E. Lee, University of Maryland, College Park

• Committee Votes and Polarization in the House - Josh Ryan, Utah State University

• From Enactment to Repeal: When and Why Repeals Happen - Nathaniel A Birkhead, Kansas State University; Jordan Ragusa, College of Charleston

• The limits of electoral accountability: passing the buck for inaction - David Doherty, Loyola University Chicago; Laurel Harbridge Yong, Northwestern University

Chair

• Michael Crespin University of Oklahoma

Discussant

• Eric Schickler University of California, Berkeley