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Non-Inflated Measures of Governmental Instability

Thu, August 30, 11:00 to 11:30am, Hynes, Hall A

Abstract

We challenge the accepted measures of governmental instability common in the literature and databases, which are based on governmental durability. We argue that these measures, which rely on the combination of 3 criteria (change in partisan composition; change in the identity of the Prime Minister, and occurrence of general elections) are from one perspective too inclusive (not any change in government's partisan composition signifies instability), and from another perspective too narrow (focusing almost exclusively on a government as a whole). We further examine and demonstrate which of the criteria contributes more to stability, and whether it matters from a political perspective. We demonstrate that a country might be characterized by stability in one criterion and instability in another.
Using Israel as a motivating example, we reach two major conclusions: first, counting any change in partisan composition as an instance of a new government inflates the measures of instability and is, therefore, wrong. We consequently advocate a more appropriate criterion according to which only changes in a government's partisan composition that reduce the number of MPs that support the government and turns the government to either a minority government or a minimum winning coalition government, constitute a criterion for instability.
Second we show that while Israel might be characterized by relatively rapid government changes (although not as rapid as was previously identified), its electoral environment, as well as prime ministerial longevity seem relatively stable.
Having discussed the pitfalls of the existing prevalent measures of government instability and demonstrating them using the Israeli context, we propose new measures for governmental instability and demonstrate their usefulness in a comparative setting.

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