The Relationship Between Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering

• In Event: Constituency Influence in Congress: District Interests and Gerrymandering

Abstract

Many observers have argued that the interpretation of the Voting Rights Act as requiring the creation of majority-minority districts has helped Republicans win legislative seats by “packing” minority voters into a small number of overwhelmingly Democratic districts. As a result, there is a presumed tension between racial and partisan gerrymandering. We examine the question of whether efforts to combat partisan gerrymandering pose a threat to efforts to create districts in which minority politicians can prevail, and vice versa. Preliminary analysis of Florida’s House districts shows that the goals of providing reasonable opportunities for minority representation and partisan fairness are not necessarily in conflict. In this paper, we extend that analysis to other states and factor in evolving legal standards for the how large a minority population a district need have to elect a non-white legislator. We use a new process to generate tens of thousands of alternative legislative maps to examine the practical ramifications of different numbers of majority-minority districts with different levels of minority population on the partisan fairness of a map. The results show that racial and partisan gerrymandering are only squarely in conflict when the minority population of majority-minority districts is especially high.

Authors

• Robin E. Best, Binghamton University (SUNY)

• Shawn J Donahue, Binghamton University

• Jonathan S. Krasno, Binghamton University

• Daniel Blyth Magleby, Binghamton University

• Michael D. McDonald, SUNY, Binghamton University