Preference for Secession: The Divide over Catalan Secession

• In Event: Endogenous State Formation: Secessionism, Self-Rule, and Irredentism

Abstract

This paper studies preferences for secession in wealthy, democratic contexts. Using experimental evidence, we evaluate the extent to which secessionist demands are deemed sincere or strategic. Similarly, we assess whether pro-independence sympathizers may be talked out by the central government by offering fiscal or identitarian concessions. To understand the full secessionist game, we investigate individual-level willingness to accommodate secessionist demands among the general public in the titular state. To address these questions, we exploit various experiments embedded in two parallel surveys, one in Spain, another in Catalonia, days before the snap regional election in Catalonia in December 2017. We draw individual-level preference hypotheses from International Political Economy (IPE) literature and nationalism studies. We assess egocentric and sociotropic considerations, conduct a series of list experiments to discover latent prejudices, and implement a conjoint analysis fed with key policy areas to explore the feasibility of constitutional reform in a highly polarized context.

Authors

• Didac Queralt, Yale University

• Maria Jose Hierro, Yale University