Power-Sharing and the Use of Ex-Combatants in Counterinsurgency Operations

• In Event: Understanding Counterinsurgency

Abstract

Peace agreement provisions that call for the integration of former rebel soldiers into the national military have been envisioned as one possible solution to the commitment problems that often bedevil civil war termination. In some cases, military power-sharing requires the rebel forces to be accountable to the central command structures of the army, disarm prior to training, and disperse geographically throughout the country. In other cases, such as the Cordillera People's Liberation Army in the Philippines and the National Congress for the Defense of the People in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the rebels are allowed to operate under a parallel structure of command, keep their caches of arms, and remain in their traditional territorial strongholds. This variation in type and level of military integration is unexplained in the current literature. I argue that how military power-sharing is structured explains when ex-combatants are likely to participate in counterinsurgency operations against other rebel groups. Integration that breaks down insurgent organizational structures is an inherently slow process. Allowing insurgent groups to maintain combat units with established trust and operational procedures in familiar territory facilitates the quick deployment of ex-combatants. Using an original cross-national dataset, I demonstrate that these design features increase the likelihood that former rebel soldiers participate in counterinsurgency operations against other insurgent forces.

Author

• Caroline Brandt, UC Berkeley