Bureaucratic Impartiality and Quality of Public Services

• In Event: Representative Bureaucracy: New Directions and New Evidence

Abstract

This study investigates an understudied link between bureaucratic impartiality and quality of public services using regional level governance data in European countries (Charron et. al 2014; 2015). Impartiality of government institutions has been considered as the core measure of the quality of government in good governance studies (Rothstein and Teorell 2008). Bureaucratic impartiality and quality of public services are also regarded as an indicator of government quality (Charron et. al 2015). However, very few studies actually examine a relationship between impartiality and public service quality and conditioning factors that may affect the relationship. We still do not know whether and under what conditions government impartiality is linked with service quality.
In addition, there have been critiques against the use of government impartiality as a theoretical core of government quality (Fukuyama 2013, Im and Hartley 2017). Output measures such as quality of public services should be separated from measure of government quality. They should be a dependent variable explained by government quality, not being a part of it (Fukuyama 2013, Im and Choi 2018). Impartial public administration may not be a sufficient condition for high-quality government. It needs capacities of bureaucracies for effective delivery of public services (Rotberg 2014, Fukuyama 2013). Thus, it is significant to separate impartiality from output measure and examine how other bureaucratic attributes are associated with the impartiality-service quality link.
To fill this research gap, we examine how bureaucratic impartiality is associated with quality of public services and conditioning factors that may affect this relationship. In doing so, we rely on novel cross-national survey data of 85,000 citizens covering 206 regions in 24 European countries: the 2013 European Quality of Government Index (EQI) (Charron et. al 2015). The EQI data set contains a novel measure of impartiality and capacity of bureaucracy coming from perceptions of citizens, not expert (Charron et. al 2016). Our study will take advantages from the data set.
The unit of analysis is individual. Bureaucratic impartiality and capacity variables are regional level. Therefore, we employ multilevel models, having individual-level factors nested in regional level factors. The dependent variable is quality of public services measured by citizen satisfaction. This study uses a subjective measurement of public service quality. The independent variable is regional level administrative impartiality measured by citizen perception. The EQI data set contains a question concerning the degree of impartiality in three areas of public services. The data sets also contains regional level aggregated variable of citizens response, which we utilize Since both dependent and independent variable are coming from citizens, common source bias may be an issue. To solve this, we utilize a previous wave of the 2010 EQI data (Charron et. al 2014) for the regional level impartiality variable. We also follow the same procedure for regional-level bureaucratic capacity measurement: the degree of professionalization of bureaucracy (Charron et. al 2016).
We test the following three hypotheses. First hypothesis is that bureaucratic impartiality is positively associated with quality of public services. Impartial administration assures credible commitment of public officials to public services, deterring arbitral use of public authority and political patronage (Miller 2000). Thus, we expect the positive influence of impartiality on citizen satisfaction. However, the effects of impartiality on service quality may be contingent on various factors. We test one demographic and one bureaucratic factor as conditioning factors. Impartiality may not equally affect citizen satisfaction. Citizens in relatively disadvantaged groups in society may prefer being favorably treated by government rather than equally treated with other citizens. Thus, our second hypothesis is that administrative impartiality does not lead to citizen satisfaction among citizens in disadvantaged position such as low income and education. The third hypothesis is that administrative capacity boosts the positive impact of impartiality on satisfaction. As Fukuyama (2013) argues, high-performing government needs, not only impartiality, but also bureaucratic capacities to effectively deliver services. However, this claim has not been empirically tested. Moreover, Im et al. (2012) argue that a few studies examine the link between internal management of public organizations and citizen satisfaction.. We use the degree of meritocracy of bureaucracy as a measurement for capacity (Fukuyama 2013) and test how meritocracy boosts the influence of impartiality on satisfaction with service provisions. Preliminary results of this study confirm the above proposed hypotheses.

Authors

• Kohei Suzuki, Leiden University

• Mehmet Akif Demircioglu, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore