Beyond State Capacity: The Electoral Logics of Land Formalization in Kenya

• In Event: The Politics of Land Reforms and Agrarian Change

Abstract

When and why do elites choose to formalize land rights? Many existing studies assume that formal tenure rights accompany the distribution of land or property. Yet there are many cases where the state distributes land but fails to provide formal tenure rights, creating a “property rights gap” (Albertus 2017). Existing research suggests that under authoritarian regimes—where elites have few institutional constraints, or where the state lacks the institutional capacity to formalize rights—a property rights gap emerges or endures. Yet regime type and state capacity alone do not account for the significant variation we observe in land rights formalization at the sub-national level. In contrast to cross-national analyses, we use micro-level data on land allocation and formalization in Kenya to examine why state elites close the property rights gap in some agrarian localities but not others. We find that elites under a democratic regime are not more likely to formalize rights. Rather, the logic of land formalization changes. Whereas leaders under authoritarian regimes are likely to prioritize co-ethnics, we find that in the context of multi-party elections, elites prioritize non-co-ethnics or perceived swing voters.

Authors

• Mai Omer Hassan, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor

• Kathleen Klaus, University of San Francisco