Population Pressures: Migration, Repression, and Agrarian Reform

• In Event: The Politics of Land Reforms and Agrarian Change

Abstract

Emigration is often portrayed as a “safety valve” that reduces population pressure and social unrest. I develop a model to illustrate that this ameliorating effect of outmigration can have ambiguous consequences for redistribution. Outmigration can reduce pressure on elites to redistribute land, but it may also lower the political and economic costs of reform. This can open up opportunities for agrarian change when elites might otherwise prefer to repress mobilization. Conversely, a shock to the availability of exit options can lead to increased mobilization for change, but it can also encourage elite repression. I present empirical support for the model using subnational evidence on migration, agrarian mobilization, and agrarian change in Mexico, El Salvador, and the Philippines over the 20th century. I conclude by discussing the broader implications for the study of migration and politics and redistributive politics more generally

Author

• Emily A. Sellars, Yale University