A Theory of Tripwires: British Troop Deployments Could Have Stopped World War I

• In Event: New Analytic Perspectives on the First World War

Abstract

This paper develops a theory of tripwires, the forward deployment of troops to allied territory. Conventional thinking stresses that such deployments bolster deterrence by ensuring that an ally would become immediately entangled in war, as its deployed troops would be immediately caught in combat. However, some historical episodes as well as emerging public opinion research is casting doubt on this proposition. We develop a supplemental perspective, that forward troop deployments can under the right conditions bolster deterrence by increasing the fighting power of local forces. We apply our argument to the July 1914 crisis preceding World War I. The German war plan required the rapid conquest of Belgium. A conventional argument is that the British commitment to Belgium failed to deter Germany, either because Britain did not clearly signal its intention to intervene, or because the signals were clear but Germany was motivated to believe that Britain would not intervene. We argue that the peacetime deployment of British troops to Belgian territory could have deterred a German attack and stopped the war. It would have increased the likelihood of Germany believing that Britain would intervene if Germany invaded Belgium. More importantly, British troops could have substantially slowed down the German advance through Belgium, disrupting the entire war plan, perhaps dissuading Germany from being so willing to push for war. Our argument has important contemporary policy implications, especially for the forward deployment of American troops to areas such as South Korea and Eastern Europe.

Authors

• Paul Poast, University of Chicago

• Dan Reiter, Emory University