A Comparative Study of the July Crisis and Its Precursors

• In Event: New Analytic Perspectives on the First World War

Abstract

Hypothesized causes of the First World War include strategic rivalries, imperialism, arms races, polarized alliances, power imbalances, power transitions, offensive military doctrines, territorial conflicts, hegemonic ambitions, militaristic strategic cultures, hypermasculine cultures, military influence on decision-making, domestic economic interests, tendencies toward increased risk-taking and brinkmanship in successive crises, overconfidence in the mechanisms of dispute resolution, nationalism, diversionary motivations, dysfunctional political systems, and mediocre political leadership. However, many or most these causal factors were present in the crises of 1905, 1908-9, 1911, and 1912-13. The peaceful resolution of the earlier crises raises the question of why a European war occurred in 1914 but not before. This variation in outcomes provides the opportunity, neglected by scholars, for a comparative study that provides increased analytic leverage over the extraordinary complexity of the road to war in 1914.

Author

• Jack S. Levy, Rutgers University