Movers, Stayers, and the Partisan Transformation of Southern Politics

• In Event: The Nationalization of Politics: Evidence across Cities, Regions, and Nations

Abstract

In his magnum opus, Southern Politics in State and Nation (1949), V.O. Key predicted that immigration to the South and urbanization of the southern landscape would serve as an engine of growth for the Republican Party. Key believed northerners would be drawn by the economic opportunities offered by the growth of southern cities. And as the overwhelming majority of southerners were Democrats at mid-century, he predicted that the percentage of Republicans among northern emigrants would be significantly higher percentage than the percentage of Republicans in the South.
Far more recent research on the political implications of urban growth and migration patterns also suggests a Republican advantage. During the last quarter of the 20th century, much of the population growth in southern metropolitan areas has been in the suburbs ringing urban centers, and these areas have been hotbeds of Republican growth during the same time period. In The Big Sort (2008), Bill Bishop argues that American migrants sought communities that shared their cultural identities and chose their future neighbors accordingly. As native white southerners became more Republican, Bishop’s argument implies they were attracting ever-greater numbers of Republicans from outside the South. In fact, Bishop predicted significant growth in the number of Republican-dominated mega-counties during the early 21st century
The hypothetical migration and urbanization patterns should have produced Republican dominance in those areas that (1) grown most quickly and (2) attracted the largest numbers of migrants (often, the same places). But that has not happened. Just as in the U.S. as a whole, recent elections have shown that urbanized areas are increasingly Democratic while rural areas are increasingly Republican. Over the last two decades, where southern communities have grown significantly, the Democratic Party has benefited. That wasn’t supposed to happen. Why did it?
I argue that migration patterns are far more sensitive to economics and economic circumstances than a culturally-focused theory of migration admits. In short, jobs matter as much as they ever have. And those who move for jobs are not a random cross-section of the American population. They are simply more likely to be Democrats. Those locales that draw the largest numbers of migrants are then most likely to lean in the Democratic direction. And migrants moving into these fast-growing communities find themselves in more integrated neighborhoods than more economically-stagnant communities. The Democratic leanings they bring with them are reinforced by the diversity of the communities in which they choose to live.
These migration patterns—driven, fundamentally by a search for economic opportunity, have important implications for the areas that migrants leave behind. Those areas—unless they are overwhelmingly populated by minorities—will tend to become increasingly Republican. And they will be more segregated, so the Republican tendencies of those left behind are reinforced by the increasing segregation of the communities in which they live. In the 21st century, there is still a “big sort” occurring—and that sort has political implications. But the areas of growth in the South are not becoming more Republican; they are becoming more Democratic. It is the areas of waning population that are tending to become more Republican. Sorting is occurring, but it is not the sorting described by Bishop (at least not since the beginning of the Great Recession). As long as party differences are driven by racial, ethnic, and cultural differences, this dynamic will continue.
Using county-level data from 1990 to the present, I analyze the relationship between population growth, economic growth, and partisan change in the South, testing the “movers and stayers” hypothesis that economic growth and population growth are associated with increasing support for the Democratic Party. In contrast to existing research on growth and partisan change in the South—and Bishop’s “Big Sort” argument—I find strong support for the “movers and stayers” explanation for Southern partisan change.

Author

• Irwin L. Morris, North Carolina State University