Fiscal Conditions for When Dictators Hold Elections

• In Event: Elections in Autocracies and Weak Democracies

Abstract

Why do dictators hold new elections for national offices? Dictators that hold elections are increasing in frequency yet some prominent explanations on this phenomenon do not produce observable and testable implications. I embed the logic of existing explanations into a theory that derives new testable implications. I argue that a survival-maximizing dictator's fiscal capacity determines whether they hold elections to promote their political survival. My argument predicts that dictatorships with moderate levels of revenue have a greater propensity to hold new elections compared to dictatorships with low or high levels of revenue. The theory produces additional testable implications. As a dictator's revenue increases, their proportion of spending on repressive capacity decreases. Also as a dictator's revenue increases, their proportion of spending on rents to the opposition increases. I test the implications of the theory with quantitative data, finding support for the hypotheses.

Author

• Austin Michael Mitchell, Texas A&M University