Emergency Powers and the Heterogeneity of Terror in Democratic States

• In Event: Key Concepts in International Security

Abstract

Recent terrorist violence has led several states to grant extraordinary powers to the executive. Scholars have not yet examined whether the provision of such emergency powers influences the probability of future terrorist attacks. I argue that when democratic states grant emergency powers to the executive, domestic incentives can push leaders to take overly aggressive actions that are counterproductive for reducing future terrorist violence. However, these domestic incentives vary depending on the in-group or out-group nature of the terrorist group. Using data on emergency provisions within democracies, I test the relationship between states of emergency, emergency power strength, and the probability of terrorist violence. In a global sample of democratic states, I find that while emergency powers increase future attacks from out-group terror arising from separatist groups, they have no effect on terror from groups that reflect extreme positions within the political order. These results express the conditional nature of executive freedom in combatting terrorism.

Author

• Bryan Rooney, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid