Improving Public Works Distribution and Procurement in the Philippines

• In Event: Understanding Elites Views and Behaviors

Abstract

We conducted a field experiment in the Philippines to evaluate the causal effects of a social accountability initiative on the transparency and distribution of public works provision. Using government data, we observe patterns of inefficiency in the distribution and procurement of public works, favoring projects that allow politicians to extract greater illicit rents, municipalities governed by the same political dynasty as the member of the House of Representatives, and private contractors that are connected to incumbent politicians. We provided a large coalition of civil society organizations in the Philippines with measures of district-level inefficiencies in public works provision. In approximately half of the 238 congressional districts randomly assigned to treatment, our civil society partner conducted advocacy targeted at members of the House of Representatives. We expect treated representatives in competitive districts to improve the accountability of public works distribution and the transparency of public works procurement. We will collect end-line results in April 2019.

Authors

• Eitan Paul, University of Michigan

• Nico Ravanilla, University of California San Diego

• Allen D. Hicken, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor