Power Sharing Effects on Vertical and Horizontal Accountability in Africa

• In Event: Advances in the Study of Power Sharing Coalitions

Abstract

While a power-sharing agreement may be central to the successful resolution of conflict, the literature on war-to-democracy transitions is more sceptical about the effects of power sharing on the quality of institutions. Guaranteed political inclusion for the leaders of former belligerent parties is often argued to undermine the representativeness of elections and to increase opportunities for corruption. This study employs new data from the Varieties of Democracy project to test these hypotheses on a sample of 22 conflict-prone states in Sub-Saharan Africa since the “Third Wave” (1990-2015). Relying on a time-series regression analysis technique developed by Teorell (2010), which distinguishes between “upturns” and “downturns” on the dependent variable, the findings lend little support to the argument that power sharing has been detrimental to horizontal accountability in the region. On the other hand, consistent with previous studies by Linder & Baechtiger (2005) and Norris (2008), power-sharing solutions have been associated with significant improvements across indicators of vertical accountability, such as the quality of elections.

Author

• Chelsea B. Johnson, The London School of Economics and Political Science