Learning to Build Opposition Alliances in Electoral Autocracies

• In Event: Weakening Autocracy: Internal and External Opposition Forces in Dictatorships

Abstract

Forming opposition alliances in presidential autocracies entails selecting a single opposition candidate to compete against the incumbent autocrat. Yet, intra-opposition competition among party leaders frequently result in the failure to build such alliances. Under what conditions will alliance formation occur? This paper, part of an ongoing book project, utilizes the bargaining model of war to analyze the bargaining dynamics between opposition party leaders. Specifically, it proposes that uncertainty over the relative popularities of opposition party leaders leads to belligerent non-cooperation. Clear information about their relative popularities, however, leads to alliance formation. Opposition party leaders learn such information through previous elections, or through highly salient public events. A paired historical comparison of opposition alliance formation in autocratic Philippines and South Korea near the end of the Cold War tests the model’s propositions. Historical evidence comes from secondary literature, newspaper reports, and declassified American diplomatic cables and Congressional hearings.

Author

• Jiayun Elvin Ong, University of British Columbia