Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Personal Schedule
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Whether or not Islamist political parties can redirect Islamist mobilization away from anti-system violence toward non-violent partisan participation is a point of consistent debate. However, previous work has consistently argued that a key mechanism in both the processes of de-radicalization and moderation is the competitiveness of elections. This paper offers a more complex vision of these patterns of mobilization by tracing the effect of Islamist political parties on levels of Islamist violence in four of the most competitive contemporary regimes in the Muslim world where Islamists consistently compete in elections: post-revolutionary Tunisia, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia. These four countries should see low levels of Islamist violence because of their Islamist parties’ ability to competitively challenge the incumbent elites, but within these cases, only Malaysia has consistently experienced low levels of Islamist violence. I argue and find evidence that the effect of electoral competitiveness on levels of Islamist violence is conditioned by both the efficacy of subnational governance and the independence of the Islamist movement and party from the regime because Islamist opposition groups are motivated by a complex system of interests that are both parochial and national and both religious and political. While Malaysia’s political system has allowed the Islamist party to balance these competing—and sometimes contradictory—interests with broad subnational structures of governance, competitive elections, and relative autonomy for opposition groups, the other three systems have failed to provide the full institutional dynamism for Islamist partisan participation. Evidence from the case studies is further verified through statistical analyses. These findings have significant implications for policy-makers’ efforts to limit Islamist violence. This paper also suggests that Islamist groups are not unequivocally undemocratic and that their relationship with democratic regimes is best understood through a multifaceted conceptualization of democracy.