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Conventional wisdom in International Relations (IR) theory holds that states are expected to emulate innovative military technologies (Waltz 1979/2010, Resendes-Santos 2010) and if they do not, it is because they lack the organizational or financial capacity to do so (Horowitz 2010). I argue that financial and organizational (in)capacity to emulate does not fully explain state responses to new military technologies. I widen the spectrum of state reactions to incorporate under-explored cases (counter, dismissal or adaptation) and, based on that, I explain a state’s reaction to new military technologies by using a two-stage argument that sheds light on the interaction between the international threat environment and domestic organizational preferences, along with visions of victories. I find that states pursue military effectiveness in policy options other than just emulation – regardless of their capacity to emulate or not. Studying these alternative reactions will help us grasp regional military balances in a more accurate way and come up with more realistic predictions and answers to questions such as battle initiation, number of casualties or conflict duration.