Factors Incentivizing Bipartisan Coalition Building in the American Legislatures

• In Event: Parties and Leaders in US State Legislatures

Abstract

Much of our research has focused on party polarization in closely competitive electoral chambers as an explanation for the decline of bipartisan cooperation. But these are not the only factors that affect the ability to compromise across party lines. My study identifies the institutional and constituency features that facilitate bipartisan compromise. It is based on a national survey of state legislators and members of Congress (n ≈ 1850), along with an extensive collection of hard data on all the legislators in my cohort (legislators in office in the summer of 2014) and on institutional and political characteristics of the legislatures. In the survey, legislators were asked how much time they spent on building coalitions to pass legislation. They were asked separately about building coalitions within their own party and across parties (5-point scales). The main dependent variable is the difference between the time spent on bipartisan coalition building and the time spent on partisan coalition building. The time a legislator devotes to cross-party versus same-party coalition building is determined by political context, such as divided versus unified government, and by features of institutional design, for example, unmet super majority requirements, and leadership professionalization. The statistical models will be estimated with Bayesian hierarchical models.In addition to the survey measure of bipartisanship, hard data on bill sponsorship and floor votes will be examined as well.

Author

• Lynda W. Powell, University of Rochester