Trading Places, Trading Platforms: The Geography of Realignment

• In Event: Poster Session: International Political Economy II & Conflict Processes I
  In Poster Session: Poster Session: International Political Economy II

Abstract

In advanced democracies with plurality electoral systems,
formerly pro-trade Right parties have become proponents of protectionism, while previously protectionist Left parties are now championing free trade. This "partisan realignment" has been accompanied by a "voter realignment," as educated voters who once supported Right parties now vote overwhelmingly for the Left. I explain these puzzling realignments by developing a formal theory linking political and economic geography. In advanced plurality countries, Left parties control high-density electorates, while Right parties are responsive to low-density constituencies. Employing a spatial equilibrium model from Economic Geography, I demonstrate that trade exposure (and technology) causes skilled workers to sort into high-density areas in pursuit of higher wages, while unskilled workers move towards low-density areas in search of a lower cost of living ("skill-sorting"). As skilled workers sort into high-density districts, Left incumbents choose more pro-trade platforms, while Right platforms increasingly endorse protectionism, yielding a "partisan realignment" on trade. Due to changing party platforms, educated voters increasingly vote for the Left, and uneducated voters defect to the Right, resulting in a "voter realignment" as well. I conclude by finding strong evidence for the mechanisms of my theory.

Author

• Bryan Schonfeld, Princeton University