Classes, Sectoral Interests and Elites: The Politics of Growth Models

• In Event: The Coalitional Dynamics of Distributive Politics in the Knowledge Economy

Abstract

This paper seeks to theorize the relationship between growth models and supporting social blocs. The paper takes issue with the emphasis on electoral politics (coalitions) in many recent contributions to comparative political economy. In our alternative theoretical perspective, electoral politics is essentially a constraint—not the “driver”—of policy choices that determine economic growth trajectories, and public opinion is less important than elites' preferences (especially the preferences of hegemonic producer groups) with regard to key policy decisions. Like an earlier CPE tradition, we focus on the interaction of class and sectoral interests, but we emphasize the limited options of subordinate groups, hierarchical power relations within the dominant social bloc, and the representation of different fractions of capital in policy-making. We illustrate our approach by tracing reconfigurations of the dominant social bloc in Germany and Sweden since the 1970s.

Authors

• Lucio Baccaro, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies

• Jonas Pontusson, University of Geneva