The Effect of Perceived Madness on Coercion: An Experimental Approach

• In Event: Experimental Research on the Psychology of Conflict Bargaining

Abstract

This manuscript refines the theoretical logic behind the “Madman Theory” – the argument that it can be beneficial in coercive bargaining to be viewed as mad, or insane. I identify four types of perceived madness, broken down along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether a leader is perceived to (a) make rational calculations, but based on extreme preferences or (b) actually deviate from rational consequence-based decision-making. The second dimension is whether a leader’s madness is perceived to be (a) situational or (b) dispositional. I argue that situational extreme preferences constitute the type of perceived madness that is most helpful in coercive bargaining. I test my theory in a survey experiment, in which I examine the impact of each form of perceived madness on respondents’ willingness to make concessions in a coercive bargaining scenario.

Author

• Roseanne McManus, Pennsylvania State University