Coups, Police Shootings, and Nuclear War

• In Event: Formal Models of International Politics

Abstract

Thomas Schelling (1960) famously argued that mutual fears of a violent preemptive attack could spiral, leading to an actual attack even when both sides preferred no attack. His main concern was nuclear war, but it seems potentially relevant in numerous settings, including police shootings and military coups. Surprisingly, no satisfactory game-theoretic model of the problem exists; at least, no model exists in which mutual fears actually do spiral into a conflict. Robert Powell (1989) presented a model that, for good reasons, cast doubt on the argument. I analyze static and dynamic game-theoretic models that depart from Powell's approach by introducing a small chance of an aggressive type and noisy signals of the other side's actions. These can produce both "calm" and "hair trigger" equilibria, and allow analysis of factors that make reciprocal fears situations more or less explosive.

Author

• James D. Fearon, Stanford University