What Motivates Politicians? Evidence from a Lab-in-the-Field Experiment in India

• In Event: Local Politicians and Public Goods Provision

Abstract

Well run state institutions contribute crucially to economic development and welfare and competent, honest and pro-social politicians are key ingredients for good governance. There is, however, an acute shortage of evidence on whether politicians are guided by social preferences (e.g., concerns for constituents’ welfare) and whether the preferences of self-selected politicians differ from those of ordinary citizens. Using data from lab-in-the-field experiments conducted in rural India with local politicians and non-politician participants, we find that in modified dictator games, politicians do not differ from ordinary citizens when their actions can be concealed. However, when the visibility of actions increases, politicians keep more and distribute less generously than ordinary citizens. We find differences between politicians who won and politicians who lost elections, and by politician gender: in the high visibility treatment, women politicians and those who lost elections appear to feel less entitled to keep the spoils than others who were elected for office.

Author

• Kunal Sen, UNU-WIDER