"Scoring Points?" Diverse Judicial Nominations and Presidential Accomplishment

• In Event: Gender and Diversity in Judicial Politics

Abstract

Conventional wisdom holds that presidents can “score points” with the public by strategically nominating members of underrepresented groups to judicial positions. Despite the prevalence of this narrative, our understanding of how diverse appointees influence public evaluations of presidential achievement is underdeveloped. In this paper, we use a conjoint experimental design to examine whether, and how, diversity in judicial appointments influences American evaluations of presidential achievement. A conjoint design is well suited to this question because it allows us to examine how the selection of diverse appointees influences public opinion compared to other factors commonly found to influence presidential legacies. Using a nationally representative sample, we present survey respondents with a series of hypothetical presidential profiles, that randomly assign information about twelve attributes of the president’s administration. Respondents are then asked to make a holistic evaluation of each hypothetical president’s achievement in office. This design allows us to test whether Americans actually consider the diversity of nominees when evaluating presidential legacies. In other words, do presidents actually “score points” when they elevate underrepresented groups to the bench, or do other factors play a greater role?

Authors

• Alex Badas, University of Houston

• Katelyn E. Stauffer, University of South Carolina