Interfaith Interactions, Populism and Perceptions: A Game Theoretical Analysis

• In Event: The Role of Religion in Conflict Processes

Abstract

The literature on interfaith cooperation/communication has missed the effect of perceptions and representation concerns of religious leaders involved, hence cannot account for how populism figures into the communications of religious leaders. How do perceptions influence the success of interfaith communications? In this paper, we develop a game theoretic model to account for the reputation concerns of religious leaders when they engage in interfaith communications, and we apply these models to the cases of interfaith initiatives in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine. We show how the outcomes can be affected when participants cater to populist demands, and how iterated interactions influence the success of joint religious initiatives.
We propose four dynamic game models of incomplete information classified into two categories. In each model, the players are the community assumed as unitary and the participant from the same community but who takes part in the dialogue. The first category consists of signaling games where the uninformed players move last. The player who initiates the game is informed of its preferences over the outcomes of the interaction, but the second-mover misperceives how the first player evaluates the outcomes of the interaction. The first mover can be the community or the participant; hence there are two versions of the signaling game. The second category consists of screening games where uninformed player moves first. Hence, screening games assume information conditions that are the opposite of signaling games. The player who moves first can be the community or the participant to the dialogue, like signaling games. Thus, there are two versions of the screening game as well.
We demonstrate how these models help explain the failure or success of interfaith interactions in Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine (both cases are built based on interviews and field research). Based on our game theoretical approach and case studies, we find that religious actors who have a history of preferring mutual cooperation to mutual defection and conflict are more likely to have successful interfaith communications. Even if one participant in religious cooperation would prefer a scenario where the other party is cooperative while her remaining defiant for reputational purpose, as long as she values a mutual solution/cooperation to mutual defection/conflict, the interfaith interaction will be more likely to be successful. We also find that trust matters most in long term. The parties will be more tolerant of a “defiant” looking behavior if they believe that they are dealing with a partner who is sincere and not populist, than with a partner who cares more about his reputation than the communication itself. That is why it is critical for parties to the interfaith interaction to convey their genuine interest in dialogue and that they are not vulnerable to external pressure, or catering to populist demands.

Authors

• Nukhet Ahu Sandal, Ohio University

• Serdar Sahabettin Güner, Bilkent University